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Abstract 
Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and 
subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp 
contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. To prevent the collapse of the banking 
system, the government offered FIM 8 billion in capital injections. Parliament appropriated 
the funds in the spring of 1992 and terms were defined in June 1992. The program was 
open to all banks, in proportion to their size, regardless of their solvency. In the fall of 
1992, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed to 56 cooperative banks and 22 savings banks of which 
FIM 5.0 billion went to five banks. By January 1996 FIM 6.6 billion had been paid back and 
by November 1999 FIM 7.9 billion had been paid back with only one institution 
outstanding. 
Keywords: Capital Injection, Finland, Nordic Banking Crisis 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
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At a Glance  
Following a large-scale deregulation of 
the financial sector during the 1980s and 
subsequent massive credit expansion, a 
banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp 
contraction in the economy in the early 
1990s. The contraction caused a sharp 
decline in property prices and a 
dramatic increase in banks’ non-
performing loans. To prevent the 
collapse of the banking system, the 
government offered FIM 8 billion in 
capital injections.  
Parliament appropriated the funds in the 
spring of 1992, and terms were defined 
in June 1992. The program was open to 
all banks in proportion to their size, 
regardless of their solvency. In the fall of 
1992, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed to 56 
cooperative banks and 22 savings banks 
of which FIM 5.0 billion went to five 
banks. By January 1996, FIM 6.6 billion 
had been paid back, and by November 
1999 FIM 7.9 billion had been paid back 
with only one institution’s debt 
outstanding. 
The broad-based capital injection was 
one of a number of actions taken by the 
Finnish government during the crisis. 
Other actions include the allocation of an 
initial FIM 20 billion (although later 
increased) for the creation of the 
Government Guarantee Fund, and the 
creation of the asset management 
company Arsenal to absorb the 
nonperforming loans of, first, the Savings 
Bank of Finland, then other struggling 
banks. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “The aim is to counteract the 
deterioration of deposit banks’ solvency, which 
significantly limits their ability to lend and thus 
worsens the recession as investment and consumer 




proposed March 1992; 
approved April 29, 1992; 
terms defined June 1992 
Operational Date Autumn 1992  
Sunset Date Not defined 
Program Size FIM 8 billion (U.S. $1.8 billion) 
Peak Usage FIM 7.9 billion deployed to 56 
cooperative banks and 22 
savings banks of which FIM 5.0 
billion went to five banks  
Capital 
Characteristics 
Tier-1 capital, noncumulative 
convertible preferred shares 
with an interest rate set slightly 
above market rate that 
increased gradually  
Injection’s 
Percent of Total 
Tier-1 capital  
14% of the sectors’ regulation-
prescribed capital  
Key Features -Offer to all banks regardless of 
their solvency  
-Amount per institution was 
related to their RWA or in 
proportion to their balance-
sheet size and their off-balance-
sheet commitments  
-Losses could only eat into the 
capital after a bank’s 
distributable equity capital and 
the reserve fund had been 
exhausted  
-Banks could apply only twice, 
final time in December 1992 
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An academic study conducted by the Bank of Finland showed that, “capital growth via 
government capital injection exert[ed] a positive effect on lending in 1992” (Vihriala 1997) 
Historians at the Bank of Finland reported that, “without the capital injections that they 
had received in autumn 1992 the capital adequacy of many banks would have fallen below 
the statutory minimum” (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012). An academic review of the Nordic 
Crisis by three economists at the Bank for International Settlements said, “[of the Nordic 
countries] the capital injection scheme most supportive of aggregate demand was adopted 
in Finland” (Borio et al. 2010) . 
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Finland Context 1992 
GDP $113 billion in 1992 
GDP per capita $26.7 billion per capita in 1992 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
 
As of 1992: 
S&P: AAA 
Size of banking system $103 billion in 1992 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
91.3% in 1992 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Unknown 
Five-bank concentration of banking system Unknown 
Foreign involvement in banking system Unknown 
Government ownership of banking system Unknown 
Existence of deposit insurance Yes 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World 












I. Overview  
Background 
Buildup 
During the 1980s there was a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector as outlined in 
the chart below. The government allowed banks to lend into areas where they had not lent 
before and therefore lacked market-specific knowledge. Regulatory decisions were subject 
to court challenges, and it has been theorized that this, “raised the threshold for 
introducing stricter supervisory practices” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). In addition, 
regulators lifted strict limits on deposit and interest rates. More broadly, the supervisory 
authorities were viewed as relatively weak—“they lacked resources and qualified staff and 
did not prioritise on-site inspections” (Moe et al. 2004). The savings banks were taking 
extraordinary risks and were undercapitalized.  
Figure 1: Financial market liberalization in Finland 
 
Source: Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994. 
During the same period, both household and corporate debt increased significantly. The 
Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish “tax systems encouraged borrowing through very 
generous rules for deducting interest expenses from taxable income” (Moe et al. 2004). 
Household debt rose from 25% of GDP in 1980 to 45% in 1992, and corporate debt rose 
from 70% of GDP to nearly 90% of GDP in just a couple of years starting in 1989 (Mayes et 
al. 2001). Housing prices doubled between 1986 and 1989, and the Finnish stock market 
tripled between 1985 and 1988 (Mayes et al. 2001). Commercial property prices may have 
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increased even more than residential. This led to the traditional cycle where the increases 
in property prices lead to higher collateral values which facilitate an increase in bank 
lending.  
Finally, there were two significant international events that affected the Finnish economy 
in the late ’80s and early ’90s. First, Finland was scheduled to join the European Union in 
1995 and use the new Euro currency in 1999 (EU 2019). However, the steps taken to 
prepare caused a dilemma. Finland could use exchange-rate targeting in the late ’80s and 
early ’90s and make the transition to the Euro smoother, but the resulting interest rates 
would be lower than they naturally would have been, and borrowing would outpace 
growth. Alternatively, they could raise interest rates to dampen the borrowing but lose the 
exchange rate peg and risk a disruptive transition to the Euro. They chose the former 
(Mayes et al. 2001). 
Second, Finnish exports collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union (Moe et al. 2004). The 
Soviet Union had accounted for approximately 15% of the exports of Finland (Mayes et al. 
2001). The decrease in exports to the former Soviet Union caused a negative demand shock 
of approximately 2.5% of GDP to the Finnish economy (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).  
The Crisis 
Finland was not alone in suffering a banking crisis and economic downturn during the 
early 1990s. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark experienced crises that, although they had 
distinct causes and effects, were similar in many ways. However, Finland suffered the most 
with a growth rate of -8% of GDP during the worst of the crisis years and a peak 
unemployment rate at over 20% (Mayes et al. 2001). 
Figure 2: GDP Growth and Unemployment Rate in Finland in the 1980s and 1990s 
GDP growth (%) Unemployment (%) 
  
Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001. 
Lending to the public by all Finnish deposit banks more than doubled from FIM214b to 
FIM491b from 1985 to 1990 (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Throughout the time period, GDP 
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was growing at a similar pace, so this lending represented a consistent 75% of GDP 
(WBGDP). Then from 1991 to 1995 bank lending fell by more than a third. It would take 
nine years before bank lending returned to the pre-crisis levels (Moe et al. 2004). This 
dramatic build-up and then crash of the banking sector can be seen in the following two 
charts showing the decrease of employment in banking by more than half and, similarly, 
the closure of more than half of physical bank branches. By 1993, nearly one in five loans 
were non-performing (Klingebiel 2000).  
Figure 3: Size of Banking Sector by Number of Employees and Branches in the 1990s 
Banking employees per 1,000 people Bank branches per 1,000 people 
  
Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001 
In mid-January 1992, the Prime Minister organized a working group with the goal of 
“draw[ing] up a concrete programme to safeguard the banking system” (Kuusterä and 
Tarkka 2012). The group was chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Finland and included 
members from the finance ministry and leadership from all of the major banks. The 
number-one recommendation from the group’s March 16, 1992, report was, “to set aside 
funds [FIM 5 to FIM 10 billion] that could be used for capital investments to reinforce bank 
equity” (PMGroup 1992). This suggestion became the capital injection program authorized 
by parliament in April 1992.  
Along with a number of suggested actions that the banks themselves could take—
including: reduce operational costs and staff (3.3.1), avoid overcorrecting and limiting 
lending too much (3.3.2), and do better risk management (3.3.3) (PMGroup 1992)—the 
working group’s other significant recommendation was that the government complete 
measures that had begun the previous autumn in establishing a Government Guarantee 
Fund (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012). (See Nygaard’s 2020 Finland-Arsenal YPFS case for 
more details on the Government Guarantee Fund and the asset management company.) 
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The Finnish Parliament acted quickly on the proposals from the working group’s report. On 
April 29, 1992, approximately six weeks after the report’s publication, Parliament 
authorized the Government’s recommended bank capital injection as part of the 1992 
Supplementary Budget Proposal. The proposal took the report’s suggested FIM 5 billion to 
FIM 10 billion (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012) and authorized up to FIM 8 billion. The budget 
explained the purpose of the capital injection as follows: “to counteract the deterioration of 
deposit banks’ solvency, which significantly limits their ability to lend and thus worsens the 
recession as investment and consumer demand decline” (Budget 1992). An additional 
purpose was to “help banks avoid [further] emergency support” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 
1994). 
In June 1992, the Bank of Finland (BoF), which is the country’s central bank, and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) outlined the terms of the capital injections (Vihriälä 1997). The 
voluntary program was open to all banks (Moe et al. 2004), regardless of their solvency. 
Banks received the funds in autumn 1992 (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012) and were permitted 
to apply twice, the final time in December 1992 (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).  
The size of the capital injection was determined by the size of the bank, as measured by 
their risk-weighted assets, balance sheet (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012), and their off-balance 
sheet commitments (Vihriälä 1997). The injection was structured as non-cumulative, 
convertible preferred capital (Moe et al. 2004). The conversion could be executed by the 
government if interest remained unpaid for three years in a row or if the bank’s solvency 
ratio fell below the legal minimum (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).  
The variable interest rate set on the preferred shares was set slightly above market and, 
“gradually increase[d] in relation to market to incentivise banks to repay.”3 Bank losses 
could only eat into the injected capital after the bank’s distributable equity capital and 
reserve funds had been exhausted (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Banks were permitted to 
pay back the full sum in installments or all at once (Teemu 1992). However, interest 
payments had to be made before dividends to other shareholders could be distributed 
(Report 1993).  
Outcomes 
The government acknowledged the risk inherent in the bank capital injections. In the 
Supplementary Budget Proposal, passed in April 1992, the parliament admitted, “The 
return on an investment may be forfeited to the extent that the bank’s distributable 
 
3 The interest rates were  calculated as follows:   
1992-1997: one-year government debt + financial cost of debt + 50bp; 
1997-2000: one-year government debt + financial cost of debt + 150bp; 
2000-2007: same plus 200bp every year. 
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earnings are insufficient to pay the return” (Budget 1992). Of the FIM 8 billion parliament 
made eligible for the program, FIM 7.9 billion was deployed (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). 
That amount represented 7.1% of Finland’s 1992 GDP (Borio et al. 2010) and 14% of the 
sectors’ regulation-prescribed capital (Vihriälä 1997). The recipients included 56 
cooperative banks and 22 savings banks (Vihriälä 1997), of which FIM 5.0 billion went to 
five of the largest banks (Borio et al. 2010). None of the preferred shares were ever 
converted to common (Moe et al. 2004). 
As of Jan 1, 1996, FIM 6.6 billion outstanding with banks and FIM 1.427 billion interest 
accrued (Communication 1996). By Nov 16, 1999, FIM 7.9 billion had been repaid with only 
FIM 580 million outstanding with Skop Bank (Report 1999). (For the full story on the 
government’s interventions with Skop Bank, see the YPFS Finland-Arsenal case, Nygaard 
2020.) 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of package: The Finnish government’s capital injection was the first of two 
suggested policy decisions recommended by the Prime Minister’s working group 
to safeguard the banking system.  
A working group was established in early 1992 by the Finnish Prime Minister. The group 
included finance ministers and the heads of all of the major banks. They issued a report in 
March 1992 in which they outlined two recommendations: (1) offer a capital injection to 
the banking system of between FIM 5 billion and FIM 10 billion and (2) establish a 
Government Guarantee Fund, which was done in April 1992 (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012).  
Another action often associated with the two just mentioned was the government’s public 
announcement in August 1992 that the stability of the banking system would be secured 
under all circumstances (Moe et al. 2004). The government also abolished a stamp duty on 
securities trading on stock exchanges (Budget 1992).  
2. Legal authority: The funds for the capital injection program were apportioned as 
part of the Supplementary Budget of 1992.  
The legislative process began with the Prime Minister’s working group. The parliament 
then took up and added details to the working group’s suggestions. The Finnish parliament 
chose to allocate FIM 8 billion for capital injections into the banking system. The money 
was included in the Supplementary Budget legislation passed on April 29, 1992. The 
legislation included the following introduction, “At the heart of the measures is the State’s 
involvement in strengthening the capital structure of banks by making equity investments 
in the form of preferential equity certificates which would be included in its equity for the 
purposes of calculating the bank’s solvency” (Budget 1992). 
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3. Communication: The government made public reports, program terms, and basic 
results public. They also issued a broad pledge of support for the banking 
system.  
As the banking crisis began to unfold, the Prime Minister formed a group of government 
officials and leaders of the banking industry. The group made their report public on March 
16, 1992 (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012). The government published the terms of the capital 
injections in June of the same year (Vihriälä 1997). The list of banks that received injections 
was also made public in official government statistics (Borio et al. 2010; Vihriälä 1997).  
The government made their most significant public announcement just before the capital 
was deployed. In August 1992 they issued a statement saying, the government would 
secure the banking system under all circumstances (Moe et al. 2004). 
4. Administration and Governance: Government Guarantee Fund operated the 
capital injection with assistance from the central bank.  
The FIM 8 billion was allocated via the Ministry of Finance (Budget 1992). All bank support 
operations were run by the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF), an off-state-balance-sheet 
entity created in late April 1992 to prevent a collapse in domestic and international 
confidence in the stability of the banking system and its claims. (See Nygaard 2020 for 
more information on how the GGF’s worked with the government’s asset management 
company Arsenal). However, the Bank of Finland did contribute personnel and had an 
observer on its Board. 
5. Size, Source of Funding: FIM 8 billion was allocated via the Ministry of Finance.  
Given the Prime Minister’s working group’s recommendation that between FIM 5 billion 
and FIM 10 billion would be needed (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012), the parliament allocated 
FIM 8 billion in their Supplementary Budget of 1992 (Budget 1992). Eligible institutions 
could apply two times: by August 14, 1992, and later on December 16, 1992 (Teemu 1992). 
Nearly all of the Supplementary Budget’s FIM 8 billion was deployed in Autumn 1992. 
6. Eligible Institutions: All banks were eligible to apply for the voluntary capital 
injections, regardless of solvency.  
Regardless of solvency, all banks were eligible (but not required) to participate in the 
capital injections (Moe et al. 2004). In the end, FIM 7.9 billion of the FIM 8 billion was 
deployed (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994) to 56 cooperative banks and 22 savings banks 
(Vihriälä 1997), of which FIM 5.0 billion went to five banks (Borio et al. 2010).  
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7. Individual Participation Limits: The amount of capital injected was determined 
by the size of the bank.  
The amount of capital injected was determined based on a combination of banks’: (1) risk 
weighted assets (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994), (2) balance-sheet size (Kuusterä and Tarkka 
2012), and (3) off-balance-sheet commitments (Vihriälä 1997). 
8. Capital Characteristics: The capital injected was in the form of nonvoting, non-
cumulative, convertible preferred shares with variable interest rates set slightly 
above market rates.  
The injections were structured as nonvoting preferred capital. The non-cumulative shares 
were convertible if interest remained unpaid for three consecutive years or if the bank’s 
solvency ratio fell below the legal minimum (Budget 1992; Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). The 
three-year target (1,080 days) was chosen because it was viewed as “enough time for the 
banks to put their houses in order” (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012). None of the shares were 
converted (Moe et al. 2004).  
The variable interest rate was set slightly above market rates “to incentivise banks to 
repay” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).  
9. Other Conditions: Losses to the government’s investment could only be taken 
after a bank’s equity capital and reserve fund had been exhausted, and banks 
were obliged to show a flexible attitude towards borrowers having trouble 
servicing their debt.  
The government-injected capital could, “be used to cover losses after the bank’s 
distributable equity capital and the reserve fund [had] been exhausted” (Nyberg and 
Vihriälä 1994). The government’s investment was subordinate to bank debt, but senior to 
common equity. Interest payments had to be made before dividends could be distributed 
(Report 1993).  
One source indicated that by accepting the capital injections, banks “were obliged to show a 
flexible attitude towards borrowers having trouble in servicing their debt. To the extent 
that their solvency permitted, banks were required to meet borrowers’ needs for new 
loans. In addition, banks were not allowed to call in loans before maturity” (Borio et al. 
2010). However, despite the obligation, the authorities did not develop an enforcement 
mechanism. Ultimately, banks were left in control of their loan books, something which was 
occasionally severely criticized later. 
10. Restructuring Plan: No restructuring requirements were imposed.  
After some internal debates at the Bank of Finland, the decision was made to leave the 
restructuring plans in the hands of the banks themselves. 
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11. Fate of Existing Board and Management: No changes in governance or 
management were required.  
After some internal debates at the Bank of Finland, the decision was made that alternative 
professional executives (proficient in Finnish) in sufficient numbers were unavailable in 
Finland. 
12. Exit Strategy: There was no formal exit strategy, but the capital injection was 
designed to incentivize banks to return to private markets as soon as possible.  
It doesn’t appear that there was an official sunset clause or claw-back timeline. However, 
the capital injections were designed to incentivize banks to pay the government back and 
return to private markets as soon as possible. The interest rates were set slightly above 
market rates and were set as variable rates so as the market rates fluctuated, the 
government’s capital would remain expensive (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). The difference 
between market rates and the interest on the government capital also increased over time 
to further encourage speedy payback4 (Teemu 1992). In the initial parliamentary approval 
for the FIM 8 billion capital injection, they anticipated the likelihood of not fully recovering 
their investment, “The return on an investment may be forfeited to the extent that the 
banks distributable earnings are insufficient to pay the return” (Budget 1992). All but 
approximately FIM 500 million was returned to the government by November 1999 
(Report 1999). 
III. Evaluation  
In the Bank of Finland’s sweeping history of the central bank they report that, “without the 
capital injections that they had received in autumn 1992 the capital adequacy of many 
banks would have fallen below the statutory minimum” (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012). In a 
different publication, economists at the Bank of Finland showed that, “capital growth via 
government capital injection exert[ed] a positive effect on lending in 1992” (Vihriälä 1997). 
An academic review of the Nordic Crisis by three economists at the Bank for International 
Settlements said, “[of the Nordic countries,] the capital injection scheme most supportive of 
aggregate demand was adopted in Finland, the country that suffered the deepest recession 
of the three” (Borio et al. 2010). In a different academic review of the banking crises in the 
Nordic countries during the early 1990s, an economist from the Bank of Norway concluded 
that, “creditors’ confidence in the banking systems was quickly restored, banks returned to 
profitability fairly quickly and the impact on the economies of the banking problems 
seemed fairly modest” (Moe et al. 2004). They went on to suggest, “It can perhaps be 
 
4The interest rates were  calculated as follows:   
1992-1997: one-year government debt + financial cost of debt + 50bp; 
1997-2000: one-year government debt + financial cost of debt + 150bp; 
2000-2007: same plus 200bp every year. 
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